On September 29, the National Development and Reform Commission issued an announcement seeking public input on the "Standards for Identifying Major Hazards in Power Systems and Regulations on Their Management and Supervision (Draft for Public Comment)."

The explanatory notes mention that in Chapter 2, the section on criteria for identifying major hazards, New clause added to define flooded plant facilities ， New Quality Management Criteria for Power Construction Projects ， Added provisions for determining the layout of office and living areas in new geothermal power construction projects and maintenance (including technical upgrades), as well as new clauses specifying compliance requirements for specially trained personnel before they begin working.

The regulations clearly define any of the following scenarios occurring in the power grid or electrical equipment facilities as a major hazard:

(1) DC Transmission Control and Protection System, 330 kV and Above Grid Security The strategy tables or setting sheets for the stability control system have not been properly tuned or adjusted in response to grid changes, or on-site implementation does not align with the strategy tables or setting sheets officially issued by the grid dispatching authority.

(II) DC transmission control and protection devices, as well as grid safety and stability control devices for 330 kV and higher systems, are not configured with dual redundancy or higher; additionally, protective devices for power plants connected to the grid at 220 kV and above, along with their associated secondary circuits, DC power supplies, communication channels, and routing systems, fail to meet redundancy requirements.

(3) The excitation systems of thermal and nuclear power units with a single-unit capacity exceeding 100 MW, as well as hydroelectric units above 40 MW, either fail to be equipped with power system stabilizer functionality as required, or the power system stabilizers are not activated during grid-connected operation of synchronous generator units, contrary to operational procedures.

(4) Generating units with a single-unit capacity of 200 MW or more, integrated into power grids operating at voltages of 500 kV and above, have failed to conduct phase-reversal tests as required;

(5) Wind farms, photovoltaic power plants, and electrochemical energy storage stations connected to grids at 220 kV and above do not possess the low-voltage ride-through capability, high-voltage ride-through capability, voltage control capability, dynamic reactive power support capability, or frequency operation adaptability as specified by national standards; nor have they put their active power control systems and reactive voltage control systems into operation as required by the power dispatching authorities, nor have they completed grid-connection tests in accordance with national standards.

(6) For transformers (converter transformers) monitoring DC ±800 kV and AC 1000 kV or higher, if the acetylene content reaches 5 µL/L or the weekly increase exceeds 2 µL/L, or if the hydrogen content surpasses 450 µL/L, or if the total hydrocarbon content exceeds 450 µL/L;

(7) For substations (converter stations) with 500 kV or higher voltage, the differential settlement or inclination of transformer foundations exceeds 0.003L; for supported rigid busbars or isolator switch support foundations, the differential settlement or inclination surpasses 0.002L; for steel structure frame foundations, the settlement amount exceeds 150 mm, or the differential settlement/tilt exceeds 0.003L; and for GIS equipment foundations, the settlement exceeds 200 mm, or the differential settlement/tilt surpasses 0.002L (where L represents the length in the corresponding direction of the foundation).

(8) Inconsistencies between the as-built drawings and the actual installation of 110 kV and higher substation switches, disconnectors, and grounding equipment; or incorrect installation locations.

(9) For ±800 kV DC and AC transmission lines exceeding 1,000 kV, if the inclination of the tower body—measured from its full height—is more than 10‰ for towers taller than 50 meters, or exceeds 15‰ for towers 50 meters or shorter; similarly, for ±660 kV or 750 kV lines, the inclination of the tower body must be greater than 15‰ for towers taller than 50 meters, or exceed 20‰ for towers 50 meters or shorter.

(10) Within critical transmission corridors under national-level control, there are flammable materials—such as oily plants like pine and cedar—that could trigger complete shutdowns of the transmission lines, along with instances of construction-related damage (e.g., blasting activities within protected zones), yet no effective mitigation measures have been implemented.

Original text:

The National Development and Reform Commission is publicly soliciting input on the draft "Power Restructuring...

Standards for Identifying Major Accident Hazards and Regulations on Supervision and Management of Remediation

(Draft for Public Comment) Announcement of Comments

To thoroughly implement the important instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping on safety production, strengthen the identification and elimination of major potential hazards in the power sector, and effectively prevent and curb power-related accidents, we have organized the revision of the "Trial Standards for Identifying Major Power Safety Hazards," resulting in the "Standards for Identifying Major Power Safety Hazards and Regulations on Supervision and Management for Hazard Remediation (Draft for Public Comment)." We are now soliciting public input on this draft.

The public consultation period will run from September 29, 2025, to October 28, 2025. Please visit the "Interactive Exchange" section on the homepage of the National Development and Reform Commission's official website (.cn), then navigate to the "Opinion Solicitation" column to submit your comments and provide your reasoning.

Thank you for your participation and support!

Attachment: 1. Criteria for Identifying Major Electrical Safety Hazards and Regulations on Supervision and Management for Remediation (Draft for Public Comment)

2. Explanatory Notes on the "Standards for Identifying Major Electrical Safety Hazards and Regulations on Supervision and Management of Remediation"

National Development and Reform Commission

September 29, 2025

Original text:

Attachment 1

Standards for Identifying Major Hazards in Power Systems and Regulations on Supervision and Management of Remediation

(Draft for Public Comment)

Chapter 1 General Provisions

Article 1: To strengthen the identification, investigation, and remediation of major hazards in the power industry (hereinafter referred to as "major hazards"), and effectively prevent and curb power-related accidents, these Regulations are formulated in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Work Safety," the "Regulations on Electric Power Supervision," and relevant laws and regulations.

Article 2: For the purposes of these regulations, a "major electrical accident hazard" refers to unsafe human behaviors, unsafe conditions of equipment or materials, other hazardous factors present in work areas or working environments, and deficiencies in safety management—any of which may arise due to the absence, failure, or weakening of safety risk control measures within an electric power enterprise, potentially leading to severe consequences such as widespread power outages, significant casualties, or substantial economic losses.

Article 3: These Regulations apply to the identification, investigation and remediation, as well as the supervisory management, of significant potential hazards in the power sector.

Article 4: The National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, as well as local people's government departments responsible for electricity management (hereinafter referred to as "local electricity management departments"), shall assess major hazards in accordance with these Regulations. Power enterprises bear the primary responsibility for identifying and addressing major hazards, and must carry out related work as outlined in these Regulations. Meanwhile, the National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, along with local electricity management departments, are tasked with overseeing and managing the remediation of major hazards, ensuring compliance with these Regulations throughout the process.

Chapter 2: Criteria for Identifying Critical Hazards

Article 5: Any of the following conditions occurring in the power grid or electrical equipment facilities shall be classified as a critical hazard:

(1) The strategy tables or setting lists for DC transmission control and protection systems, as well as for grid security and stability control systems operating at 330 kV and above, have not been properly recalibrated or adjusted in response to changes in the power grid; alternatively, on-site implementation does not align with the official strategy tables or setting lists issued by the grid dispatching authority.

(II) DC transmission control and protection devices, as well as grid safety and stability control devices for 330 kV and higher systems, are not configured with dual redundancy or higher; additionally, protective devices for power plants connected to the grid at 220 kV and above, along with their associated secondary circuits, DC power supplies, communication channels, and routing systems, fail to meet redundancy requirements.

(3) The excitation systems of thermal and nuclear power units with a single-unit capacity exceeding 100 MW, as well as hydroelectric units above 40 MW, either fail to be equipped with power system stabilizer functionality as required, or the power system stabilizers are not activated during grid-connected operation of synchronous generator units, contrary to operational procedures.

(4) Generating units with a single-unit capacity of 200 MW or more, integrated into power grids operating at voltages of 500 kV and above, have failed to conduct phase-reversal tests as required;

(5) Wind farms, photovoltaic power plants, and electrochemical energy storage stations connected to grids at 220 kV and above do not possess the low-voltage ride-through capability, high-voltage ride-through capability, voltage control capability, dynamic reactive power support capability, or frequency operation adaptability as specified by national standards; nor have they put their active power control systems and reactive voltage control systems into operation as required by the power dispatching authorities, nor have they completed grid-connection tests in accordance with national standards.

(6) For transformers (converter transformers) monitoring DC ±800 kV and AC 1000 kV or higher, if the acetylene content reaches 5 µL/L or the weekly increase exceeds 2 µL/L, or if the hydrogen content surpasses 450 µL/L, or if the total hydrocarbon content exceeds 450 µL/L;

(7) For substations (converter stations) with 500 kV or higher voltage, the differential settlement or inclination of transformer foundations exceeds 0.003L; for supported rigid busbars or isolator switch support foundations, the differential settlement or inclination surpasses 0.002L; for steel structure frame foundations, the settlement amount exceeds 150 mm, or the differential settlement/tilt exceeds 0.003L; and for GIS equipment foundations, the settlement exceeds 200 mm, or the differential settlement/tilt surpasses 0.002L (where L represents the length in the corresponding direction of the foundation).

(8) Inconsistencies between the as-built drawings and the actual installation of 110 kV and higher substation switches, disconnectors, and grounding equipment; or incorrect installation locations.

(9) For ±800 kV DC and AC transmission lines exceeding 1,000 kV, if the inclination of the tower body—measured from its full height—is more than 10‰ for towers taller than 50 meters, or exceeds 15‰ for towers 50 meters or shorter; similarly, for ±660 kV or 750 kV lines, the inclination of the tower body must be greater than 15‰ for towers taller than 50 meters, or exceed 20‰ for towers 50 meters or shorter.

(10) Within critical transmission corridors under national-level control, there are flammable materials—such as oily plants like pine and cedar—that could trigger complete shutdowns of the transmission lines, along with instances of construction-related damage (e.g., blasting activities within protected zones), yet no effective mitigation measures have been implemented.

Article 6: Any of the following situations occurring in a power monitoring system that spans more than one prefecture-level administrative region, or in a grid-connected power plant/substation with a voltage level of 500 kV or higher, shall be classified as a significant hazard:

(1) No dedicated, unidirectional lateral security isolation device for power systems is deployed at the connection points between the production control area and the management information area, as well as the secure access area.

(II) The connection point between the production control area and the wide area network of the power monitoring dedicated network lacks a dedicated longitudinal encryption authentication device or an encryption authentication gateway for power systems.

(III) Unauthorized connections between the internal network of the production control area and external networks (including direct inter-zone links, connections to the internet, etc.).

Article 7: Any of the following conditions occurring in gas-steam combined-cycle generating units with a single-unit capacity exceeding 200 MW, or in coal-fired or concentrating solar power units with a single-unit capacity over 300 MW, shall be classified as a significant hazard:

(1) The proposed steam turbine governing system components (including main and regulating steam valves) are experiencing sticking or seizing issues; alternatively, the tightness of both the main and regulating steam valves—when arranged in series within the same cylinder—is found to be substandard; or the overspeed protection test was either not conducted as required or yielded unsatisfactory results.

(II) Failure to establish emergency measures for handling overspeed conditions in steam turbine units, or failure to conduct regular emergency drills despite having such measures in place;

(3) During commissioning or operation, high-temperature and high-pressure steam/water systems located near control rooms, main passageways, and daily operational areas experience leaks, yet live-line leak sealing is performed without effective isolation or without shutting down the system.

(4) The metal materials used for the generator set shaft system supports and rotating components are substandard, or metal inspections have not been conducted as required.

(5) The overall structural strength of steel structures, supports, hangers, and load-bearing welds in key equipment and facilities—including coal-fired boiler flue and air ducts, dust collectors, desulfurization absorption towers, denitrification catalyst systems, slag storage bins, pulverized coal silos and hoppers (including ash hoppers), and coal-handling gantry bridges—is insufficient to meet structural integrity requirements.

Article 8: Any of the following situations occurring at hydropower stations under the supervision and regulation of the National Energy Administration shall be classified as a significant hazard:

(1) The factory building lacks flood protection design, or its flood protection design does not meet regulatory requirements;

(II) The lowest-level corridor in the main plant building is not equipped with a flood-warning system to protect the facility.

(III) The control room must not directly control unit shutdown, closure of emergency gates, or main valves on pressure pipelines via hardwired circuits or any other reliable method.

(4) Factory buildings have leaks, and the maintenance drainage system is not functioning properly;

(5) Engineering slopes, water diversion and power generation structures, other engineering facilities, metal structural equipment, mechanical and electrical equipment, and more are operating with severe quality defects that could lead to collapse, landslides, or other serious consequences after assessment.

Article 9: Any of the following conditions occurring at hydropower station dams under the supervision and regulation of the National Energy Administration shall be classified as a significant hazard:

(1) The hydropower station dam has not been registered for safety compliance.

(II) Putting the reservoir into operation without completing the impoundment acceptance process, or unilaterally raising the flood control limit water level and the normal storage water level;

(3) Issues such as insufficient flood protection capacity of the dam, inadequate overall stability of the dam structure, through-type cracks in the dam body, leakage or compromised seepage stability in the dam body, dam foundation, and abutments, damage or blockage of flood discharge and energy dissipation structures, malfunctioning or unsafe operation of spillway gates and gate operators, and geological hazards in the reservoir area—after thorough analysis and assessment—call for measures to reduce the reservoir water level as much as possible.

(4) The operating power supply for the flood discharge gate is not functioning properly, and there is no reliable emergency power source available.

Article 10: Any of the following conditions occurring at the ash storage dam of a coal-fired power plant shall be classified as a significant hazard:

(1) The ash storage facility failed to conduct a safety assessment as required;

(II) The ash storage facility is classified as a hazardous site based on its safety rating;

(III) The ash storage dam shows severe abnormalities such as cracks or signs of landslides, and no corrective measures have been taken yet;

(4) Conducting operations such as blasting, well drilling, quarrying, mining, and earth removal within the safety management area of the ash storage facility—activities that pose risks to the facility's structural integrity.

Article 11: Any of the following circumstances occurring in power construction projects or power maintenance (including technical upgrades) projects shall be classified as a significant hazard:

(1) Shortening the contractually agreed project duration without proper justification, or failing to implement the measures recommended after due consideration;

(II) Outsourcing power construction projects and maintenance tasks to enterprises or individuals that lack the necessary safety production conditions or relevant qualifications;

(III) Undertaking power construction projects or power maintenance tasks without proper qualifications, or beyond the scope of authorized qualifications and business activities;

(4) For high-risk sub-projects exceeding a certain scale in power construction projects—specifically those compliant with the "Guidelines for Safety Management of Power Construction Project Construction" (NB/T 10096)—the specialized construction plans have not been prepared, reviewed, approved, subjected to expert evaluation, or accompanied by proper technical briefings as required. Additionally, these specialized plans contain significant deficiencies, or critical safety measures outlined in the plans have failed to be implemented effectively.

(5) Construction units or general contractors engaging in construction subcontracting—other than labor subcontracting legally permitted—for the main components of a power construction project;

(6) Conducting hazardous operations such as blasting, hot work, lifting and hoisting, temporary electrical work, confined space entry, working near energized equipment, and deep excavation projects without completing the required approval procedures or assigning dedicated personnel to oversee on-site safety management.

(7) Conducting hot work in crowded or flammable/explosive areas without the workers holding the appropriate specialized job qualifications;

(8) Office and living areas within the land-use red lines of power construction projects, as well as office and living facilities for power maintenance projects (including technical upgrade projects), are located in high-risk zones prone to natural disasters such as landslides, collapses, flash floods, mudslides, and avalanches.

Article 12: Any of the following circumstances identified in the quality management of power construction projects shall be classified as a significant hazard:

(1) The construction entity failed to carry out project quality supervision procedures as required by national regulations, or did not initiate quality supervision at all, or failed to obtain the official Quality Supervision Connection Opinion Letter as mandated.

(II) Power construction projects fail to pass completion acceptance due to quality issues, or are delivered for use despite failing the acceptance inspection;

(3) Survey and design institutions failed to prepare survey and design documents in accordance with mandatory construction standards and the state’s relevant requirements for survey and design depth, or significant design changes were made without properly following the prescribed change procedures.

(4) The construction unit engaged in practices such as cutting corners or using substandard materials—such as inadequate construction materials, building components, or equipment—in critical areas like the foundations, main structural elements, major equipment, and load-bearing components of key buildings and structures. Alternatively, they may have failed to follow engineering design drawings or construction technical standards during the building process.

Article 13: Any of the following circumstances occurring in the safety management of power enterprises shall be classified as a significant hazard:

(1) Failure to fully set aside the required amount of safety production funds as stipulated by national regulations, resulting in actual expenditures falling below 60% of the annually allocated amount, coupled with the failure to disclose this information as required and submit a written explanation; additionally, expenditures incurred fall within the scope of the negative list for safety production costs specifically outlined for power generation and supply enterprises.

(II) Specialized personnel assigned to work have not undergone the required specialized safety training and obtained the corresponding qualifications as mandated.

(III) Critical safety facilities for new, renovated, or expanded projects were not designed, constructed, and put into operation and use simultaneously with the main project.

(4) Shutting down, sabotaging, or disabling monitoring, alarm, protective, and life-saving equipment and facilities directly related to production safety; or tampering with, concealing, or destroying their associated data and information.

(5) Failure to develop an emergency rescue plan for production safety accidents as required, or failure to conduct emergency drills as prescribed.

Article 14: Except for the circumstances listed in Articles 5 through 13, any other power safety hazards that could lead to severe consequences such as widespread power outages, significant casualties, or substantial economic losses shall be classified as critical hazards.

Chapter 3: Identification and Remediation of Critical Hazards

Article 15: The principal person in charge of a power enterprise is the primary responsible party for identifying and addressing major hazards within the organization, bearing full responsibility for all activities related to such hazard identification and remediation efforts.

Article 16: Power enterprises shall establish a major hazard identification and remediation system that includes, but is not limited to, the following elements:

(1) Requirements, responsibilities, and accountability for identifying and addressing critical hazards among key personnel, those in charge of specific areas, departmental staff, and position holders;

(II) Major hazard identification items, specific details, and inspection cycles;

(III) The management process for critical hazards;

(IV) Evaluation of Major Hazard Remediation Results;

(5) Training on the Identification and Management of Critical Hazards;

(6) Internal Reporting Reward Mechanism for Accident Hazards;

(7) Financial, personnel, and equipment & facility support.

Article 17: Power enterprises shall regularly organize safety production managers, technical specialists, and other relevant personnel to identify major hazards within their organizations. Identified major hazards must be recorded in detail, including information such as the subject of the hazard, the date of identification, the personnel involved, and a specific description of the hazard itself. After review and approval by the principal person in charge of the power enterprise, these records shall be properly stored and promptly communicated to employees and other relevant parties, ensuring they are aware of the emergency measures to be taken in case of an urgent situation.

Article 18: Power enterprises shall establish a system for reporting major hazards. Upon identifying a significant hazard, they must report it to the branch office of the National Energy Administration and the local power management authorities. For hazards involving the safety of hydropower station dams, a simultaneous notification should also be sent to the National Energy Administration’s Dam Safety Supervision Center. The report on major hazard information shall include: the hazard’s name, its current status and underlying causes, an analysis of the hazard’s potential severity and the difficulty level of remediation, as well as a detailed remediation plan (see Appendix for specifics).

Article 19: If a major hazard poses risks to the safety of neighboring regions, organizations, or the general public, the power enterprise shall promptly notify the relevant parties in adjacent areas and units, and report the situation to the appropriate departments of the local people's government. Additionally, the enterprise must implement necessary isolation measures at the site and install clear safety warning signs.

Article 20: Power enterprises shall establish a ledger for managing major hazards, develop practical and feasible remediation plans, and clearly assign responsibility, allocate funding, implement specific measures, and set deadlines for completing the remediation. During the process of addressing major hazards, enterprises must strengthen monitoring efforts and adopt effective preventive measures to ensure safety. If necessary, they should also formulate emergency response plans and conduct regular emergency drills.

When addressing critical hazard remediation that involves other organizations, power companies should coordinate with the relevant entities to ensure timely resolution. If difficulties arise, they must report the issue to the National Energy Administration and its regional offices, as well as local power management authorities, for coordinated assistance in finding a solution.

Article 21: If safety cannot be ensured before or during the elimination of significant hazards, power enterprises shall suspend production and operations of the relevant project or facility, cease operating equipment and facilities posing major risks, evacuate personnel, and promptly report the situation to the National Energy Administration's local offices and local power management authorities.

Article 22: After completing the remediation of a major hazard, power companies shall organize an assessment of the remediation efforts and promptly report the assessment results to the branch offices of the National Energy Administration and local power management authorities. If the hazard involves operational safety concerns related to hydropower station dams, the company must also simultaneously report to the National Energy Administration's Dam Safety Supervision Center.

Article 23: After a power enterprise has addressed significant safety hazards identified and ordered to be rectified by the National Energy Administration, its dispatched agencies, or local electricity regulatory authorities, it may resume production, operations, or usage only if the hazards have been assessed as meeting both safety production standards and the requirements of the inspection authority.

Article 24: Power enterprises shall promptly report the identification and remediation status of significant hazards to the staff assembly or the employee representative assembly.

Article 25: Power companies shall impose appropriate disciplinary actions on employees who fail to effectively identify and address significant hazards.

Article 26: Power enterprises shall analyze the root causes of common issues and typical hazards identified during hazard identification processes, examining each stage—including planning and design, material procurement, construction and commissioning, and operational management—and develop and implement targeted preventive and corrective measures from both managerial and technical perspectives.

Chapter 4: Supervision and Management

Article 27: The National Energy Administration's dispatched agencies, the Dam Safety Supervision Center, as well as local power management departments and power construction project quality supervision bodies, shall report any significant hazards identified during inspections or submitted by enterprises (see detailed information in the attachment) to the National Energy Administration within 10 working days, following the appropriate hierarchical reporting process.

The National Energy Administration's dispatched agencies and local power management departments may, in accordance with laws, regulations, and relevant provisions, supervise and expedite the remediation of major hazards that are difficult to address, require extended timelines, or stem from external factors beyond the control of the affected production and operation entities. If deemed necessary, the National Energy Administration itself may directly take over such supervision. Supervision can be carried out via a "Supervision Notice," which typically includes key details such as the name of the supervision effort, the specific issues being addressed, requirements for corrective actions and ongoing risk controls, the deadline for completion, and the procedures and methods for lifting the supervision.

Article 28: Any organization or individual who discovers significant hazards or uncovers illegal activities related to the identification and remediation of major hazards has the right to report or file a complaint with the National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, as well as local electricity regulatory authorities.

Article 29: The National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, as well as local electricity regulatory authorities, shall strengthen their information technology infrastructure. They should regularly collect and analyze data on the identification and remediation of major hazards at power enterprises, and integrate these critical hazards into relevant information system management.

Article 30: The National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, as well as local power management departments, shall order immediate or time-limited elimination of any major hazards identified during inspections. If safety cannot be ensured before or during the removal of a major hazard, they must instruct workers to evacuate from the hazardous area, temporarily halt production or operations, or cease using the relevant equipment and facilities.

Chapter 5: Legal Liability

Article 31: If the principal person in charge of a power enterprise fails to organize and implement a mechanism for identifying and addressing potential hazards, or if they fail to promptly eliminate safety risks associated with production accidents, they shall be ordered to make corrections within a specified time limit and fined between RMB 20,000 and RMB 50,000. If the corrections are not made by the deadline, the enterprise will face a fine ranging from RMB 50,000 to RMB 100,000.

Article 32: If a power enterprise fails to accurately record the identification and remediation of significant hazards, or fails to inform its employees about such measures, it will be ordered to make corrections within a specified time limit and fined up to RMB 100,000. If the enterprise fails to comply by the deadline, it will be ordered to suspend production and business operations for rectification, and will face a fine ranging from RMB 100,000 to RMB 200,000. Additionally, the directly responsible supervisors and other individuals directly accountable will be fined between RMB 20,000 and RMB 50,000.

Article 33: If a power enterprise fails to establish a system for identifying and addressing significant hazards, or if it fails to report the status of such hazard identification and remediation efforts, it shall be ordered to make corrections within a specified time limit and fined no more than 100,000 yuan. If the enterprise fails to comply by the deadline, it will be ordered to suspend production and business operations for rectification, and fined between 100,000 and 200,000 yuan. Additionally, the directly responsible managers and other individuals directly accountable will face fines ranging from 20,000 to 50,000 yuan. If the actions constitute a crime, criminal liability will be pursued in accordance with relevant provisions of the Criminal Law.

Article 34: If a power enterprise fails to take measures to eliminate significant hazards, it shall be ordered to eliminate them immediately or within a specified time limit, and fined no more than 100,000 yuan. If the enterprise refuses to comply, it will be ordered to suspend production and business operations for rectification, and its directly responsible managers and other directly liable personnel will face fines ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 yuan. In cases where the actions constitute a crime, criminal liability will be pursued in accordance with relevant provisions of the Criminal Law.

Article 35: If a power enterprise falls under any of the following circumstances, the National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies shall revoke its relevant licenses and permits, and recommend to the local people's government that the enterprise be shut down. Additionally, the enterprise's principal person in charge will be barred from serving as the chief executive of any production or business entity for five years; in cases of severe violations, they will be permanently prohibited from holding such a position in the power industry or any related production or business organization.

(1) There is a significant accident hazard, and the entity has received administrative penalties under these regulations three times within 180 days or four times within one year;

(II) Those that, despite undergoing production and business suspension for rectification, still fail to meet the safety production conditions stipulated by laws, administrative regulations, national standards, or industry standards;

(III) Refusing to comply with the shutdown and rectification orders issued by the National Energy Administration, its dispatched agencies, or local power management authorities.

Chapter 6: Supplementary Provisions

Article 36: In these regulations, "above" includes the specified number, while "below" does not.

Article 37: For the purposes of these Regulations, "electricity enterprises" refer to companies whose primary business activities include power generation, transmission, distribution, and electricity-related construction projects.

Article 38: These Regulations shall come into effect on December 31, 2025.

Appendix 2

"Explanation on the Development of the 'Standards for Identifying Major Accident Hazards in Power Systems and Regulations on Supervision and Management'"

To thoroughly implement the important instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping on safety production, strengthen the identification, investigation, and remediation of major potential hazards in the power sector, and effectively prevent and curb power-related accidents, we have organized the development of the "Standards for Identifying Major Potential Hazards in Power Systems and Regulations on Supervision and Management of Hazard Remediation," in accordance with the "People's Republic of China Safety Production Law" and relevant requirements from the State Council’s Work Safety Committee. Details are outlined below.

I. Necessity of Preparation

First, it is necessary to implement the relevant provisions of the *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety*. Article 118 of the revised and implemented *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety* in 2021 stipulates: "The emergency management department under the State Council, together with other departments responsible for work safety supervision and administration, shall, according to their respective duties, formulate identification standards for major hazard sources and criteria for determining significant accident hazards in relevant industries and fields." As the National Energy Administration, which holds responsibilities for supervising and managing work safety in the power sector, we must fulfill the requirements of the *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety* by developing specific criteria for identifying major accident hazards within the electricity industry.

Second, it is necessary to implement the relevant directives issued by the State Council’s Work Safety Committee. At the 2025 plenary meeting of the State Council’s Work Safety Committee, Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing emphasized, "Relevant departments must put in serious effort to elevate these standards into departmental regulations or mandatory national standards, ensuring they become truly enforceable guidelines." The Three-Year Action Plan for Root-Cause Solutions and Tough Battles in Work Safety (2024–2026) explicitly calls for proactively refining and upgrading major accident hazard identification criteria—currently issued as trial or interim measures—into more authoritative forms such as departmental regulations or mandatory national standards. Additionally, the Office of the State Council’s Work Safety Committee has pointed out that the power industry has identified a relatively small number of significant hazards, and certain provisions within the Trial Edition of the Major Power Safety Hazard Identification Standards (issued in 2022)—particularly those related to power construction and installation—lack comprehensive coverage. These issues underscore the need to enhance the standards further by introducing supplementary clauses and refining the quantitative criteria for clearer, more precise assessments.

Third, it is essential to deeply learn from past accidents and adapt to the evolving landscape of power industry safety. In recent years, China has been accelerating the development of its new-generation power system. However, vulnerabilities have emerged, including insufficient strength in certain critical nodes of the power grid, persistently high levels of power construction activity, and the growing challenge posed by large-scale integration of renewable energy sources, which has diluted the system's stability margins. As a result, the safety situation has become increasingly complex and challenging. Recent incidents, such as the blackout in Yushu, Qinghai, and the flooding of the Guanzhou hydropower plant in Sichuan, have highlighted several serious underlying risks that now require urgent attention—specifically, by promptly updating and refining the criteria used to identify and address these hazards.

II. Preparation Process and Consultation Feedback

The preparation work was launched in May 2024. Based on the "Three-Year Action Plan for Root-Cause Rectification of Safe Production in Energy and Power Systems (2024–2026)," the original plan was to upgrade the 2022 edition of the assessment criteria into a bureau-level regulatory document by the end of 2025. Following this timeline, a draft for public consultation was finalized in early 2025.

In February 2025, to thoroughly implement the spirit of Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing’s speech and comply with relevant requirements from the State Council’s Safety Committee, it was decided to issue the document in the form of a National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) order. During the consultation process, the Bureau’s Legal Reform Division and the Commission’s Regulatory Affairs Department expressed concerns that the proposed criteria were overly simplistic and noted that, under existing laws, documents explicitly titled “Standards” cannot be issued as departmental regulations. They recommended incorporating additional provisions covering responsibilities, risk identification and remediation, supervisory management, and legal accountability. Based on these suggestions, we integrated key elements from the "Regulations on the Supervision and Management of Power Industry Safety Hazard Remediation," originally released by our bureau in 2022, and subsequently renamed the document as the "Regulations on the Identification Standards for Major Power Safety Hazards and Their Supervision and Management" (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations"). In August 2025, the draft Regulations were formally circulated in writing to solicit feedback from the NDRC, the Ministry of Emergency Management, branches of the National Energy Administration, local power regulatory authorities, and member enterprises of the National Electric Power Safety Committee. Following revisions and refinements based on the collected input, an open draft for public comment was finalized.

During the consultation phase, a total of 102 comments were received. Among these, 79 were either fully adopted, largely adopted, or partially adopted, resulting in an adoption rate of 77%. The remaining 23 comments were not adopted, primarily focusing on the wording related to the responsibility of local power management departments in overseeing and managing the remediation of major hazards. Some local power authorities argued that they do not have specific duties in regulating power safety production and therefore should neither bear responsibility nor merely cooperate with dispatched agencies in carrying out safety oversight tasks. We believe, however, that this aligns with Article 3 of the *People’s Republic of China Law on Work Safety*, which states: "Work safety shall be managed according to the principles of 'managing an industry requires managing safety, managing business requires managing safety, and managing production and operations requires managing safety.' This approach emphasizes strengthening and implementing the primary responsibilities of production and operation entities as well as the regulatory duties of the government, while fostering a mechanism that ensures accountability by enterprises, active participation from employees, robust government oversight, self-regulation within the industry, and effective social supervision." Based on this principle, the draft document for public consultation includes the following key provisions: "Article 4: The National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, along with local people's governments' power management departments (hereinafter referred to as 'local power management departments') and power enterprises, shall jointly assess and identify major hazards in accordance with these Regulations. Power enterprises are responsible for conducting thorough hazard identification and remediation efforts as mandated by these Regulations. Meanwhile, the National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, as well as local power management departments, shall assume the responsibility for supervising and managing the remediation of major hazards, ensuring compliance with the requirements outlined in these Regulations." Additionally, Article 27 stipulates: "Dispatched agencies of the National Energy Administration, the Dam Safety Supervision Center, along with local power management departments and power construction quality supervision institutions, must report any significant hazards identified during inspections—or those reported by enterprises—up the chain of command to the National Energy Administration within 10 working days. Dispatched agencies of the National Energy Administration and local power management departments may, in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and guidelines, oversee and expedite the remediation of particularly challenging or time-consuming major hazards that external factors make difficult for enterprises to address independently." Finally, Article 30 mandates: "The National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, as well as local power management departments, shall order immediate elimination or set deadlines for the removal of any major hazards discovered during inspections."

III. Overall Approach to Preparation

Since the "Regulations on the Supervision and Management of Electricity Safety Hazards," introduced in 2022, have yielded positive results, our work will focus on refining the criteria for identifying critical safety hazards, guided primarily by the following principles.

First, severe consequences are used as the core criterion for identifying critical hazards. By systematically analyzing recent power-related accident patterns and pinpointing weak links in safety management, we aim to include as many potential hazards as possible within the category of "major risks"—those that could lead to widespread power outages, significant casualties, or substantial economic losses. For instance, in recent years, incidents such as turbine overspeed causing shaft or blade failures have occurred repeatedly; therefore, these related hazards have been classified as major risks.

Second, the quantitative criteria for assessment have been enhanced to improve practicality. By introducing quantifiable indicators such as threshold standards and parameter ranges, the assessment criteria have become more specific and clear, making it easier for organizations and individuals to conduct thorough inspections of critical hazards. In particular, the provisions related to construction projects and hydropower dam safety—areas highlighted by the Office of the State Council’s Work Safety Committee—have been refined and improved, ensuring broader coverage while maintaining strong operational feasibility.

Third, the criteria must align with the actual safety conditions of the industry. On one hand, compared to sectors like chemicals and transportation—where major accidents have occurred more frequently—China’s power sector has maintained relatively stable safety performance in recent years. Moreover, given that most of the 50-plus departments’ standards for identifying critical hazards contain fewer than 20 criteria, it would not be appropriate to set an excessively high number of criteria for major accident risks in the power industry. On the other hand, according to the 2022 version of the criteria, over the past two-plus years, a total of 101 critical hazards have been identified. However, the Office of the State Council’s Work Safety Committee has noted that the number of hazards identified in the power sector remains relatively low, underscoring the need to gradually expand the scope of coverage. Taking these two factors into account, we propose reasonably and appropriately broadening the scope of the criteria. After conducting a preliminary assessment of the draft guidelines, we estimate that the annual identification of critical hazards could range from 200 to 1,000, which aligns well with China’s current realities in power industry safety management.

IV. Explanation of Main Content

The "Regulations" are divided into six chapters, with the main content of each chapter as follows.

Chapter 1: General Provisions. This section primarily outlines the purpose and legal basis for these regulations, introduces the definition of significant safety hazards in the power industry as referenced in the "Regulations on the Identification and Management of Production Safety Accident Hazards (Draft for Comments)," and clarifies the division of responsibilities among the National Energy Administration and its dispatched agencies, local power management departments, and power enterprises, all in accordance with the "People's Republic of China Law on Work Safety."

Chapter 2: Criteria for Identifying Major Hazards. The number of criteria has been expanded from 8 in the 2022 version (covering approximately 20 specific scenarios of major hazards) to 10, now encompassing around 50 distinct situations posing significant risks. A new criterion for identifying flooded plant facilities has been added, following the major accident at the Guan Zhou Hydropower Station in 2022, where flooding led to severe casualties and substantial economic losses. Given the high potential for such incidents to cause widespread harm, this criterion was incorporated based on input from power industry stakeholders. Additionally, a new clause addressing quality management in power construction projects has been introduced. Poor quality control during construction can lead to serious accidents, so this criterion is included in line with Chapter 8 of the "Regulations on Quality Management of Construction Projects" (Decree No. 279). Another new provision focuses on the proper setup of office and living areas within power construction and maintenance (including technical upgrades) projects. This aligns with Article 4.1.1 of the "Technical Code for Temporary Structures at Construction Sites" (JGJT 188-2009), which explicitly prohibits constructing temporary buildings in hazardous areas prone to landslides, collapses, mudslides, flash floods, or low-lying, waterlogged regions. Furthermore, a compliance clause has been added to ensure that personnel engaged in specialized operations hold the necessary qualifications. This requirement is mandated by Article 30 of the "People’s Republic of China Law on Work Safety." Finally, several existing criteria have been refined and clarified. For instance, in response to the equipment failure incident at the Laizhou Power Plant in 2023, additional assessment elements have been introduced, such as detecting sticking or seizing issues in the steam turbine governor system components. It’s worth noting that the term "main project of power construction," mentioned in Article 11 of this chapter, will be defined more precisely through an industry technical standard currently being developed by the China Association of Electric Power Construction Enterprises. Lastly, the severity of consequences—such as "major casualties" or "significant economic losses"—as outlined in Article 14, can be evaluated according to the criteria for "major accidents" and higher levels specified in Article 3 of the "Regulations on Reporting and Investigating Production Safety Accidents."

Chapter 3: Identification and Management of Major Hazards. Building upon the "Regulations on Supervision and Administration of Power Safety Hazard Management," this section further refines the primary responsibilities of power companies in identifying and addressing significant risks. It lays out detailed guidelines for each critical step, including hazard identification, reporting, risk communication, remediation, assessment, resumption of operations, as well as establishing incentive mechanisms, penalties, and preventive measures.

Chapter 4: Supervision and Management. This section closely aligns with the relevant content of the "Regulations on the Supervision and Management of Power Safety Hazard Remediation," primarily detailing the responsibilities of supervisory authorities. Key provisions include follow-up actions for critical hazards, public oversight, information-based management, and orders to halt production, among others. Additionally, given that the National Energy Administration’s Dam Safety Inspection Center and the Electric Power Construction Project Quality Supervision Agencies routinely conduct safety and quality inspections in their daily operations, these entities are now designated as official channels for identifying significant hazards and reporting them directly to the National Energy Administration.

Chapter 5: Legal Responsibilities. This section, in alignment with the "Work Safety Law of the People's Republic of China," outlines specific accountability and penalty measures for several scenarios where hazard identification and remediation, as well as supervisory management, are inadequate.

Chapter 6 – Supplementary Provisions. This section provides explanations for the numerical ranges and the term "electricity enterprises" used throughout the document.